Abstract. In the context of abstract model theory various definability properties, their interrelations and their relation to compactness are investigated.
Introduction. This is the first of three papers on the analogues of the theorems of Beth and Craig of first order logic in abstract model theory. They grew out of an unpublished preprint [MSf which was revised and extended several times by results of both authors as well as other people. They unify results due to Badger, Ebbinghaus, Friedman, Gostanian, Gregory, Hrbacek, Hutchinson, Kaufmann, Magidor, Malitz, Makkai, Makowsky, Paulos, Shelah and Stavi. In this paper we present the abstract setting; we suppose that the reader is familiar with a standard text on model theory such as [BS] and [CK] , with Barwise's [Bal] and [MSS] . The main results here are that:
Beth's theorem together with a Feferman-Vaught theorem for tree-like sums implies a weak form of Robinson's consistency lemma (5.4) and the Robinson consistency lemma together with the Feferman-Vaught theorem for pairs implies full compactness (6.2).
In [MS2] and [MS3] , the continuations of the present paper, we present applications of the general theory to particular logics. [MS2] is devoted to compact logics and some new logics are introduced, and [MS3] is devoted to infinitary logics and A-logics. Some complicated constructions are presented in detail there.
There are three aspects of Craig's interpolation theorem and its corollary, Beth's definability theorem:
(A) Philosophical. Every implicit definition is equivalent to an explicit definition.
(B) Mathematical. Although mathematicians never really cared whether they use explicit or implicit definitions, Beth's theorem tries to explain why we always have an explicit definition of a concept whenever it is uniquely describable. The ordering in real closed fields, e.g., is unique and the proof of this gives us an explicit definition of the ordering. Or formally real fields, where every element or its inverse can be represented as a sum of squares, can be uniquely ordered. Again the proof gives us an explicit definition. Another example: Uniquely orderable groups can be characterized by an Lu¡u-sentence (cf. Bludov [Bl] ) so again there must exist an explicit definition of this ordering in La¡ül. Since most proofs of Craig's theorem are effective (in the finitary case, in the infinitary case this is more complicated) the explicit definition can also be obtained on a purely syntactical level. But we do not know of any example where this observation gives us anything deeply mathematical.
The main motivation for this paper, however, stems from the third aspect: (C) Metamathematical. Craig's theorem holds for predicate logic and second order logic as well as for Lu a and LA where A is an increasing union of countable admissible sets. First order logic can be characterized in terms of maximality with respect to some model theoretic properties. Now most of the proofs of such maximality theorems also give a proof of Craig's theorem. So "maximality" implies "Craig's theorem" sounds like a nice motto. Unfortunately LA does not seem to fit into this picture. More generally we do not know if there is a maximal logic satisfying the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem down to w and Craig's theorem; in particular Harrington and Kunen have shown independently that LU|U is not maximal in a very strong sense. Kunen uses CH and gets explicit extensions of Lu a adding prepositional connectives. Harrington gives an existence proof of 22"-many other connectives P such that LUiU(P) shares most of the properties of LU|U without CH. Both results are presented in [Ha] .
Other aspects of maximality in connection with definability properties are discussed in Feferman [Fel] and Stavi [Stl] .
The aim of these papers is twofold: To provide the reader with a reasonably complete picture of what logics do or do not satisfy what kind of definability theorems, providing proofs, counterexamples or references, and to discuss definability theorems in the setting of abstract model theory. The two cannot be separated completely. Some abstract theorems give us hints of how to find counterexamples. Some constructions of counterexamples split into two different parts one of which can be easily captured as an abstract theorem. What we hope to show, too, is how this interplay works. In detail this paper is organized as follows.
In § 1 compactness and Löwenheim-Skolem properties are defined as well as the Karp-property. Some theorems relating these properties are studied or quoted for later use. In §2 the interpolation and definability properties are introduced for pairs of logics: Craig's interpolation theorem, Beth's definability theorem, a weakened version of Beth's theorem. A-interpolation and variations around Robinson's consistency theorem. Their mutual logical interdependence is exhibited, and a theorem of Barwise is improved (Theorem 1.2.4 and its corollaries). Also a new characterization of predicate calculus is given as the maximal Karp-logic which satisfies Robinson's consistency theorem (Theorem 2.14).
In §3 Feferman-Vaught-type theorems are discussed for pairs of logics and various sum-like operations on many-sorted structures. Another characterization of predicate calculus is given involving the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, the weakened form of Beth's theorem and a Feferman-Vaught theorem for pairs of structures (Theorem 3.3 and Corollary 3.2).
In §4 we review briefly some results due to Feferman and Makowsky on uniform reduction which relates Feferman-Vaught-type theorems with definability theorems.
In §5 we describe a construction whose main motivation is to prove not Beth when not Craig. For credit see there. Variations of this construction will appear also in [MS2] and [MS3] . Its main content is a way to get implicit definitions out of counterexamples for definability theorems. It also yields an abstract theorem: Beth's theorem and a strong form of a Feferman-Vaught theorem imply the weak Robinson consistency theorem (Theorem 5.4).
In §6 we prove that under some weak assumption on set theory Robinson's consistency theorem3 implies full compactness. Although not surprising, this is a highly nontrivial theorem of abstract model theory and shows that with more effort more abstract theorems should be provable.
In §7 we finally describe a generalization of an old trick to show that second order logic does not satisfy Beth's theorem, which has been worked out by Paulos and Burgess. We conclude the paper with a survey of what logics do or do not satisfy what kind of definability property and an extensive bibliography.
There are many open problems left in the field: How can one construct explicitly logics with prescribed properties? We are still in the state of many, but scattered, examples, sometimes with rather well developed model theory (cf. [MS2] , [Kel] , [Ma3] and [BKM] for L(Q) and its extensions and [Ke2] , [Ba2] for infinitary logic), but no coherent theory is in sight. Abstract model theory had two great impulses from Lindström and Barwise, but the more 'Together with a Feferman-Vaught theorem for pairs of structures.
intriguing questions, the hard technical results, which give a field its living, seem to develop slowly. We hope to go an important step in this direction.
Here are some problems: Problem 1. Is there any fully compact logic which satisfies Craig's theorem or is there any countably generated logic which satisfies Robinson's consistency theorem and which is different from (extending) predicate calculus?
Problem 2. What are the properties compact logics have in common? What conditions are needed to prove that the union of two compact logics is again compact (or similar for other properties than compactness)?
Kueker [Kue] has developed a general theory around the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem. This is what we have in mind for an answer to Problem 2. A first step in such a direction has been made by Stavi [St2] . More explicit problems may be found in [Sh2] or in the remainder of this paper and in [MS2] , [MS3] .
Problem 3. What kind of partial isomorphisms generate reasonable logics? Is there a partial isomorphism relation (game characterization) for any elementary equivalence relation of an abstract logic? How do the partial isomorphisms reflect the properties of logics?
Stavi and Nadel [NSt] , [Na] have some interesting work in this direction. An interesting test-case are the various Henkin-quantifiers discussed in [Wa] and [Ba4] . Very recently Caicedo [Ca] got very general results concerning Problem 3, part 1.
1. Karp-logics, compactness and cardinality of models. All the definitions of abstract model theory are taken from [Bal] unless otherwise stated. Note that our languages are mostly finite and all logics have the finite occurence property. Infinite languages occur in connection with diagrams. Universes are many sorted and PC-classes may admit extra universes, so reducts are relativized reducts. We let L vary over languages and L*, L*, etc. over logics. We use also L* for the L*-formulas (sentences). Here 21 »^ 93 means that there is a set of partial isomorphisms with the Back and Forth Property (cf. [Bal] ). By a theorem of Karp [Bal] this is equivalent to 21 = 93(L00U).
4Note that L* is not always a set. A proof may be found in [Ba2j or [Lil] , [Li2] . A logic L is said to be (k, \)-compact (k, X cardinals, k > X) whenever given a set of sentences 2 of L* of cardinality k such that each subset 20 of 2 of cardinality < X has a model, then 2 has a model. Given two logics L* and L% we write L* < L* if for every <p G L* there is a <p' e L* with the same models, L* = L* if L* < L* and L* < L*.
Note that if k, < k and X, > X then (k, X)-compactness implies (k" Xx)-compactness. A proof may be found in [Ba2] or [Fl] . Let X, k, fi be cardinals and L* a logic. We say that L* has the (A, k)-Lowenheim-Skolem properly for sets of sentences of cardinality ¡x and write LS^iX, k) if whenever 2 is a set of sentences of L* of cardinality ¡i which has a model of cardinality X then it has a model of cardinality k. If ¡i is finite we omit it. LSm(k) stands "for all X > kLSm(X, k)". Proposition 1.4. Let L* be a fixed logic. (i) If no < n and L* has LS,,(k, X) then L* has LS^(k, X).
(ii) If L* < iJ and if is (k, X)-compact {has LSM(ic, X)) so L* is (k, X)-compact {has LS^k, X)).
(ii) If L* has LS^i«, x)for some k > « then L is {u, u)-compact. Proofs of (i) may be found in [Bal] as well as for (ii), (iii) and (iv) follow using Theorem 1.2.
Shelah showed that LS(k, a) does not imply LSw(ic, w). A detailed study of LS(w) may be found in [Kue] .
The following is an easy exercise and will be used later. Proposition 1.6. If a logic L* staisfies LS(X) then it has up to logical equivalence at most 2 -many sentences and therefore almost 22 -many complete theories.
2. Definability and interpolation properties. Let L* be a logic, K a class of L-structures, and ç> G L*. We define Mod(<p) = {2t|2t is an L-structure and 21V q>). lfL0cL, Mod(<p) f L(¡ = (2I|2Í is an L0-structure which has an expansion to an L-structure 21' N <p},
Interpolation properties. Let L* and L+ be two logics, L* < Lt. We say CRAIG(L*, L*) holds if whenever KX,K2 G PC(L*) and Ä", n K2 = 0 then there is K3 G EQL1) such that Kt Q K3 and K3 Q K2 {K2 the complement of K2 with respect to L-structures).
We say A-Int(L*, L*) holds if whenever KX,K2 G PQX*), ^0^ = 0 and Kxö K2 = str(L) (= all L-structures) then Kx = K2E. EQL1). A(L*) is the smallest extension Lf of L* such that A-Int(L*, L1) holds. (For its existence and construction, cf. [MSS] .) Definability properties. We say that BETH(L*, Ü) (WBETH(L*, L1)) holds, if given <p G Lf, L, = L u {?}, Pan n-ary predicate symbol, every L-structure has at most (exactly one) expansion <2t, P> 1= <p; then (<2t, 5>|2i has an expansion <2t, P > 1= <p and 5 GP*} G EC(Lf).
/o/ni consistency. T Q L* is L*-complete if whenever T is a set, 2Í N T and 93 1= r then 2t = 93(L*). We say that ROB(L*, V) (WROB(L*, Ü)) holds if whenever T Q L* is L^-complete, L, = Lu{P}, P an /i-ary predicate symbol, and cp,ij/ G Lf are such that 7" u {<p(P)} and T u (>KP)} have a model, then T u (O(P), »K^')}) ({<p(P), »KP')}) has a model (where P' is a new n-ary predicate symbol not in Lx and 4*{P') is the result of substituting P' for P in ip).
Proposition 2.1. Assume \L\ < p, \L*\ < \ifor some infinite ¡¡. and that if is (/i, u)-compact; then the following are equivalent:
The proof is left as an exercise.
Let DEF be any of the prefixes CRAIG, BETH, WBETH, ROB, WROB or 
The proofs are left as an exercise. Before we can discuss other implications we need some facts from [MSS] :
Similarly for BETH(J?(L*), B{L*)) and WBETH(WB(L*), WB(L*)). The following is taken from [MSS] .
Theorem 2.4. Assume that L* is a logic.
(i) IfL* is {k, X)-compact, so are WB(L*) and A(L*).
(ii) IfL* satisfies LSm(k, X) so do A(L*) and WB(L*).
(iii) WB(L*) does not preserve the Karp-property {neither do B{L*) nor A(L*)).
It is an open question, whether a similar theorem holds for B{L*). There are many ways to define extensions tf (minimal extensions) of a given logic L* which satisfy CRAIGfL*, L1). The problem is to define one which is in some reasonable sense canonical and satisfies an analogue of Theorem 2.4.
So no other implication in the diagram of 2.2 does hold.
Proof. To prove 2.5 we shall construct two new logics and calculate their BETH-closure and A-closure:
(i) Let L*° = L^XQ™] be the logic obtained from L^ by adjunction of a binary quantifier Qvoxyq>{x,y) which says that <p{x,y) well-orders its field. Lwo satisfies LS(o>) since it is a special case of a securable quantifier discussed in [Mai] . Note that by Theorem 6.1 below WBETH(Lwo, Lwo) does not hold.
To calculate B{Lwo) we prove: Lemma 2.6. If L contains only unary predicate symbob and equality, then
Outline of proof. We prove by induction on the explicit construction of B{Lwo) that for such L as in the hypothesis there are no formulas satisfying the hypothesis of the Beth-property in the nontrivial way.
To calculate A(Lwo) we observe:
Lemma 2.7. L{Q¿) Q A(Lwo).
Proof. Since <w,< > is characterizable by a sentence of Lwo the class of finite sets is in PC(Lwo), as well as the class of infinite sets, fj
Now Lemma 2.6 shows us that L{Q¿) is not a sublogic of B{Lvo), but by 2.7 it is a sublogic of A(Lwo), hence of A(5(Lwo)) * B{Lvo).
(ii) In [MS3] it is proven that AiL^Jg,]) does not satisfy Beth's theorem. (ii) Put L* = LWitti and tf = LM00.
Malitz showed that WBETH(L"iUi, Loeao) fails (cf. [GH, Theorem 2]). To
prove ROB(Lu a, Loeoo) we note first that a complete theory in L^^ is always categorical, so the Robinson-property follows trivially.
(iii) Hutchinson (cf. [MSS] ) showed that ^Lou{Qi)) (with quantifier "there exist uncountably many") does not satisfy Craig's theorem, in fact not CRAIGiL^ß), AiL^iß))). But A(L^(Ô)) is (<o, <o)-compact, so by Propositions 2.1 and 2.2 the result follows, with L* = L^ = ^{L^Q)). □
(ii) All possible relations between two definability properties are exhibited.
Proof, (i) Let Lcfl be the logic obtained from L^ by adjunction of a binary quantifier Qci 1xy<p{x,y) which says that <p{x,y) orders its field in an (i),-like way. As in 2.4(i) we need a lemma.
Lemma 2.10. If L contains only unary predicate symbols and equality then
The proof is as for Lemma 2.6. To end the proof of 2.9 we need:
Proposition 111. X,«" does not satisfy WROB(Ld ', V* ').
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Proof. By Lemma 2.10 and first order model theory the L-theory TM of infinite sets for L = { = } is complete in Lcf '. Let ç>, say that an ordering <, of a model is co,-like and let <p2 say that an ordering <2 is a proper initial segment of an Wj-like ordering (using additional predicates). Clearly T^ u {<p,} has a model for each i = 1,2, but T^ u {<p1( <p2} has no model, n To prove (ii) of 2.9 one uses a finitary checking argument. □ For the rest of this section we look at Karp-logics, modifying results of Barwise.
Theorem 2.12. Let L* be a Karp-logic {hence L* <Th Loe<<)).
(i) BETH(L*, LoeJ implies WROB(L*, Lmu).
(ii) WROB(L*, LJ implies that L* satisfies LS(w).
Corollary 2.13 [Ba] . IfL* is a Karp-logic and CRAIG(L*, L*) holds then LS(w) holds.
The corollary follows from the theorem via Proposition 2.2. Proof of the theorem, (i) will follow from Theorem 5.3 taking L* = L* = LMU-(ii) By 1.2 and 1.5 we may assume that <w,< > is characterizable by <p G L*. Assume for contradiction that «/-is a formula in L* with no countable but some uncountable models. Clearly {<p,^} has no model. Let T be the L^-theory of infinite sets. Since all infinite sets are partially isomorphic, T is L^-complete.
But T u {<p} and T u {«/'} have models, a contradiction. □ Theorem 2.14. Assume L* is a Karp-logic, ROB(L*, L*) holds and for every L-structure 2ft, Th£(2ft) is equivalent to a set. Then L* = L^.
Proof. Again we can assume that <w, < ) is characterizable by a sentence <p in L*. Put Tll = <«,< , . . . > and SDÎ2 = (C,ca: a < w,>, a pure set with equality and w,-many distinct constants.
Put ïïl° m \u0\ and Wfi\ = |w,|. Using the Back and Forth characterization of s, (cf. [Bal] ) we get that [3ft" 3K2, Wl § m, [2ft" Wl2, 3Rl3]. Put T = Thjarc,, 2R2, 2R°] = Th^fïli,, 2ft,, fffll], so T can be assumed to be a set and T is complete. Let ip, say that g, is a bijection from |3R,.| to \Ti3\ {i = 1,2). Clearly T u {^,} has a model (/ = 1,2) but T u {«/'i, <|'2} has no model since SDÎj 1= <p and therefore îft, is countable and 9K2 is uncountable, a contradiction. □ Corollary 2.15. Assume L* < Lwa and ROB(L*, LJ. Then L* = L^,.
Proof. Note that for every structure M, Th¿ (M) is equivalent to a set, and repeat the proof of 2.14. □ 3. Feferman-Vaught-type theorems. One basis construction in abstract model theory is the operation of taking sums of given models. In its simplest form we have the operation of pairing which associates with two structures 21,93 the structure [21, 93] for the language L which is the many-sorted disjoint union of the languages of 2Í and 93, respectively. Similarly one can form triplets, etc., or more complicated objects, of which one will be studied in §5.
Definition. Let L" L2 be languages and Lf, L] (/ = 1, 2) logics with Lf < if. Let 21,., 2i; be L,-structures. We say that FV^L*, L1) holds if, whenever 21, = 2Í,'(L/) for i = 1,2 and L3 is the language of the pair [21g, 21J then [2l" 212] = [2t'" 2t2](L*). We say that WFV/L*, L*) holds whenever FVp{L*, L1) holds for L, = L¿ = L and 2Í, = %2{lf) (F stands for Feferman, V for Vaught and W for Weak).
Remember that the pair [2l" 2t2] is the structure with the universes from 2t, and from 2I2 and relations acting on the appropriate universes. It is, loosely speaking, the disjoint union of the structures 3tx and 2t2 with variables ranging over the universes of 21, and variables ranging over the universes of 2I2.
Note that if L** < L* and L++ > Ü, then X{L*, L*) implies X{L**, LP)
where X is one of the properties above.
Theorem 3.1. Assume L* is a logic which satisfies WBETH(L*, L*) and WFVp{L*, L*) and LS(X) for some X < lu¡ck. Then <w,< > is not characterizable by a single sentence.
Proof. We give a proof for the case that X < 2a, the general case being essentially the same but more complicated. Assume for contradiction that <p G L* does characterize <w,< >. By assumption and 1.6 there are at most 22 -many theories over countable types. Consider the structure 21 = {V, u, P"{u), e> where V = U*S4)P*(w), n G w, such that 2** < a", and P"(w) is the nth iteration of the power set operation. Now consider the structure [21, 2Í] and let i¡/ be the formula which says "« is standard" using <p:
"F is a partial map from V of the first sort (i.e., Vx) to V of the second sort (i.e., VF;
"F and F~x preserve e"; "F is hereditary, i.e. if F is defined on x and v G x, it is defined on v"; "The domain of F is maximal". Clearly ^ defines F implicitly and ^ is in L*. Since there are at most 22 -many theories we may find two structures 2Íj = < Vx, u, P" e> and 2I2 = < V2, a, P2, e) such that 2t, = 2I2(L*) and P, ^ P2 but Pl,P2 c P"(w). (i) LSf», WFV,(L"", IJ and WBETHÍL^, L"J.
(ii) The Karp-property, WFV^L^, LJ) and WBETHÍL^, L"J.
Compare 3.2 also with 4.2.
The following is an abstract version of a result of Malitz [Ml] cf. also [GH] .
Theorem 3.3. Let L* be a set for all languages L and assume that Lp c L+ c L* are three logics such that WBETH(LD, L+) and WFV^L*, L*). Then the class of well-orderings is not EC{L°).
Proof. Let a < ß be two infinite ordinals such that <a, e> = < /?, e>(L*). They exist for L* is a set. Now look at two-sorted structures of the form [21, 93] where 2t and 93 are well-orderings and let F be a binary function symbol with domain 21 and range 93. Assume for contradiction that the class of well-orderings is EC(L°).Let 6 be a sentence expressing that:
(i) 21 and 93 are well-orderings,
(ii) F is an order-preserving map which is one-to-one, 4. Uniform reduction. In Feferman [Fe2] and Makowsky [Ma2] a property of logics is studied which has two advantages: It comes nearer to the original Feferman-Vaught theorem and it is directly related to Craig's theorem.
Let 2Í, be an L,-structure (/' = 1,2) and let L3 be a language for [2Í" 2ÍJ = P(21" Sy. For a logic L* we say that UR^,(L*) holds if for every sentence <p of L* there exists a pair of sequences of formulae ^J, . . ., ^J of Lf and tf/f,. . ., 4¿ of L* and a Boolean function B G 2"1"'"'2 such that The proof is left to the reader. We now want to generalize URP (uniform reduction) to a more general class of operations. Let L, (/' = 1,..., n G u>) be languages, 21, be L,-structures and R an n-ary relation on structures such that the ith argument is an L,-structure. Let L0 be the language for a structure [21,,. . ., 2ÍJ. R is said to beprojective in the logic L* if there is a PC-class K for L* such that Ä(2t" . . ., 2l") iff [2Í" . . ., 2ÍJ G #. A sentence <p G L* is said to be invariant on the range of R if for all 21,,. . . , 2In_" 2I", Wm with Ä(8,,, 2I"_ " 2IJ and *(2i" . . ., 2l"_ " 8Q we have 2i" V <p ifÎ 21; N m. A logic L* is said to satisfy UR"(L*) {uniform reduction for n-ary relations) if for every /i-ary relation R which is projective in L* and for every <p in L* which is invariant on the range of R there is an associate pair for <p on the domain of R.
Theorem 4.2. (i) UR,(L*) iff CRAIG(L*, L*). (ii) UR2(L*) í^fíej URP{L*). (iii) UR2(L*) »rp/ier UR"(L*).
The proofs of (i)-(iii) may be found in [Fe2] and [Mai] . Proof. Use Theorems 4.2 and 2.14. □ 5. Constructing implicit definitions. In this section we study a construction which enables us to obtain implicit definitions. The construction originates in the ideas of Friedman [Fr] and Gregory [Gr] . Shelah realized that the construction can be formulated in an abstract setting.
Let L = LoU{P}bea language with a distinguished predicate symbol P (unary for simplicity). Let M = L \j {f, C) where / is a unary function symbol and C a constant, both not in L. Let 2Í, 93 be L-structures.
We define now $¿(21, 93) (/" = 0,1).
(i) 5¿(2Í, 93) is an M-structure with universe N of cardinality card(2í) + card(93) + N0.
(ii)/is a function on N such that (a)/(x) = x iff C = x, (b) for all a G N there is /i G to with f"{a) = C, (c) / is onto.
Denote/_1(a) -{a} by Na (see Figure 1 ). Figure 1 (iii) There is a bijection ia: ß ^ Na (i = 0,1) where S is either 21 or 93. ia makes Na naturally into an L0 u {P}-structure which we shall denote also by Na.
(iv) for each relation symbol R G L (or function symbol) put Ra to be its interpretation on Na and put RN = UaeNRa its interpretation on N.
(v) PN is defined by a G PN => Na s 2t, a G PN =*■ Na = 93.
(vi) C G PN if i = 1, C G F* if i = 0. S^(2I, 93) and S¿(21, 93) differ only with respect to Wc. SP{% 93) is a tree with root C and nodes Na. At the node Na it splits |JVj-many times. Each branch has length w. Na ss 2t iff fia) G P and Na s 93 iff /(a) G P (see Figure 2 ). Now we put r>(21, 93) := 5/(21, 93)\L0 u {/, c}. We say that WFVT(L*, L*) holds if 21 = 93(L+) implies that T^(2I, 93) s 7^(21, 33)(L*). Proof. Sp{%, 93) is a projective operation via the characterization of <w, < >, if we replace it by a ternary operation SP{W, 21, 93) restricted to the cases 21' -21 or 2T = 93, so that the first argument describes Nc and the second argument describes Na for a G P, the third Na for a & P. □ Lemma 5.2. Let L* be a logic, L a language and P¡ {i = 0, \,2) be unary predicate symbols not in L.
Let qp, (/ = 1,2) be sentences having a model but {<p" <p2} has no model. Then there is a sentence \p G (L (J {/, c, P0})* (/, c not in L) such that:
(i) Every L u {/, c}-structure 21 has at most one expansion 21* N \p.
(ii) S}> (21, 93) N ^ provided 211= <p, and 93 Ë <p2 where P, and P2, respectively, are substituted for P0.
Proof, (i) Let <// be ^, A ^2 wim *,:/(«) = c A /(*) = at «* x = C A "/is onto"; *2: a<EP0^Na = </"'(«) -{a}, ¿ U {/, c, P0}> 1= f>"
Note that ^, G L^ and ip2 G L*. Now let 2Í be an L u {/, c}-structure and <21, P,> N 1// (/ = 1,2) (ignoring substitutions of P, for P0 in «//). We have to show that P, = P2. If a G P, then JVa N <p" if a G P2 then Na N <p2 so 6. Compactness and definability. The aim of this section is to find sufficient conditions for a logic to be compact, more precisely to study definability criteria which imply compactness. It was Lindström who observed that: This implies that L* is recursively compact, i.e. if 2 is a recursive set of sentences, such that every finite subset of 2 has a model, then 2 has a model.
Proof of 6.1. Assume for contradiction that ij/GL* characterizes <«, < , R) with L = {< , Rx,. . ., R",} including enough number theory. Let L, = L u (c) and {ifjn € w} a recursive enumeration of L, where c is a constant-symbol. (Here we use the fact that L* is finitely generated.) Consider the set of formulas of L* (Z^ = L, u {P}): 2 = {P{n) «=> \¡/n A c = «|« 6 «} where P is an unary predicate symbol not in Lv 2 is recursive; therefore it is replaceable by some formula $(P, n) using a trick due to Kleene which has been generalized by Lindström for finitely generated logics ([Kl] , [MSS] ). Now $> A ^ defines P implicitly, since the only model of 2 is <<o, < , R > and we have enough number theory.
By assumption there is 9{c') G Lf such that for every L2-structure 21 we Theorem 6.2 is due to Shelah and we shall see in Theorem 6.8 and following that the precise set-theoretic conditions. Here the hypothesis that L* is countably generated is for simplicity only. The proof of 6.2 involves two aspects: a set-theoretic one and a model-theoretic one. Instead of proving compactness we study a related notion.
Definition. L* is p-rc {^-relatively compact) if for any two sets of sentences 2,2, G L* with |2| = p and |2,| arbitrary, if for every 20 c 2 with |20| < p, 20 u 2, has a model then 2 u 2, has a model.
The following collects some simple facts about p-rc logics.
Lemma 6.3. (i) If n is regular, L* is p-rc and T¡ {i < p) an increasing family of theories of L* such that each T¡ has a model then U i<ti T¡ = T has a model.
Proof, (i) Let P¡ (/' < p) be unary predicates not in T and ip¡ be 3xP¡{x). Put 2, = {i//, -» <p\i < p and <p G 7^} and 2 = {\¡>¡\i < p). Since L* is ju-rc we verify that 2 and 2, satisfy the hypothesis of u-rc. |2| = p by definition of 2. Now let 20 c 2|20| < p. W.l.o.g. 2 is well-ordered of order type p and 20 is an initial segment say 20 = 2 [x. We have to show that 20 u 2, has a model. Let M be a model of Tx and expand to M' such that P¡M =£ 0 for i < X. Obviously AT t= 20 u 2,. Using p-rc we conclude that 2, u 2 has a model, hence T has a model.
(ii) Let 2,2, satisfy the hypothesis required for p-rc and L* be cf p-rc. There is 2; a < u such that U a<ctl^'a = 2 and |2;| < u. Now put 20 = 2; U 2,. Each 2a (a < p) has a model, so, by (i), U a<ai^a ^as a model. (ii) whenever 93 1= TK u {a,Fa,: i <j < k) then {a¡: i < k} is unbounded in K.
We say that such a TK weakly characterizes k.
Lemma 6.4. (i) If p is regular then L* is p-rc iff < p, < > is not weakly characterizable in L*.
(ii) If L* is p-rc but not X-rc, X regular and X < p then there is a uniform ultrafilter D over p which is X-descendingly complete.
Proof, (i) Assume L* is p-rc, ii-regular and let 21 = < p, <,...) be any expansion of </x,< >. Put 2, to be any subset of the L*-diagram of 21 and 2 = {!>a|aGu} where £ is a new constant symbol. Clearly 2 has cardinality p and satisfies the hypothesis of p-rc. So 2, u 2 has a model which is not /¿-like. Now assume L* is not ju-rc and let 2 "2 be a counterexample, 2 = {<pa: a G p), 2^ = {<pa: a < /?}. Put U to be a new unary predicate and E a binary relation, say (a) "E is a linear order on U"; now let R be another new binary relation, say {b)"R{x,y)-*U{x)".
Denote by <pÄ(i,j:) the relativisation of <p to the set R{£, x), where £ acts as a parameter. Say (c)y •>*«■*> -» <?/<"'*>" for each ß < a < p and <pa, <pß G 2y. The set 2y defined by (a), (b), (c)y has the same cardinality as y. Put 2; = {,,«**>: «p G 2" a G ii}.
Claim. 2', u 2^ weakly characterizes u. First we construct a model. Let 93y be a model of 2, u 2y, which exists by assumption. Put B = p u U y^By where the unions are disjoint. Now put 93 = <5, U, E, R, . .. > where t/B = p, E is the membership of p and R < U xy</iÄy such that ä(y, b) iff è G 5y. The other relations are naturally taken from the 93y. Now let 9? 1= 2' u 2¡, u {^Ea/. i <j < p}. Then {a¡:
i < k) is unbounded in i/K, for 2, u 2 has no model.
(ii) Let 3K be a rich and sufficiently large structure such that H{p+) is contained in 2T£. Let 2, be a subset of the L*-diagram of 271 weakly characterizing (XM,< > and put 2 = {a<|<jn|aGu} where | is a new constant symbol. Again 2 and 2, satisfy the hypothesis of ju-rc. So there is a model 91 such that Wfl < ^(L^) and 3? = 2, u 2. Furthermore we can assume that XM is cofinal in X^, using_(i). Now we have 9Î t= 3xVa G p (a < d=*f{x) > a) and since 2R < 9Î 2JÎ N 3xVa G u (a < d=>f{x) > a). But since XM is cofinal in X*, we conclude that (~M, =/= 0, a contradiction. □ Proposition 6.5 [KP] , [CC] . Let p be regular and D be a uniform ultrafilter on p + . Then (i) D is p-descendingly incomplete, (ii) if X < p, X regular and D is X+-descendingly incomplete, then D is X-descendingly incomplete.
(iii) [JK] Assume V = L {or -,0* or -, LM). Le/ k èe regular and D be a uniform ultrafilter on k. Then D is X-descendingly incomplete for all infinite X. Now we can characterize p-rc. Theorem 6.6. (i) L* is {k, p)-compact for all k and given p iff L* is K-rc for all k > p.
(ii) If L* is p + -rc and p is regular, then L* is p-rc. (iii) IfHais regular, n G w, and L* is &a+n-rc, so L* is {Ha, tta)-compact.
(iv) {V = L or -,0* or -,L"). If L* is p-rc then, for all X < cf(ii), L* is X-rc.
Proof, (i) One direction is trivial. Now assume L* is K-rc for all k > p. We show for each X > p that L* is (X, jii)-compact. X = p follows from 6.3 (iii), X > p from 6.3(iv).
(ii) Assume not, then by 6.4(ii), there is a uniform ultrafilter D on p+ which is /n-descendingly complete, but this contradicts 6.5(i).
(iii) Again, assume not; so, by 6.3(iii), L* is not Ka-rc, so, by 6.6(h), L* is not Jt . -re for each ä€«.
(iv) is proved with 6.5(iii) and 6.4(ii). □ After this set-theoretic digression we go back to model theory. We shall need an old result of Rabin.
Proposition 6.7 [Ra] . Let Pq be the first measurable cardinal. For every k < Pq there is a structure 2tK = (A, < > and a language L* such that (i)P G L«,<PS<a-> -<«,<>, '
(Ü) whenever 93 > 2IK(L^,) then <PS,<®> is nonstandard.
Now we are in a position to prove:
Theorem 6.8. Let L* be a logic such that \L*\ < p^for each L with \L\ < pç and such that ROB(L*, L*) and FVP{L*, L*) hold. Then L* is («, u>)-compact.
Proof. Let Bv B2 be two infinite sets of different cardinality, /ß" ß2, respectively, such that, for L = { = }, <£,> ■ <52>(L*).
Since \L*\ < p^ we may assume that ßx,ß2 < Pq using a Hanf-type argument. Now we fix k > max{ ß, ß2), k < iiq. Put 2Ç = <2tK, P, Q, a>a6H where 2tK is from 6.7, P,Q are unary and \P\ = ßx, \Q\ = ß2. Now assume for contradiction L* is not (w, «)-compact. Then WK can be expanded to 3t^ such that Th£.(2í^) is categorical (using 6.7 and 1.3). Now by FVP{L*, L*) we have [2i;, 5,] m [2i;, B2]{L*). We put now T = ThL.[H'¿, Bx\ Let <p denote the sentence which says that "F, is a bijection from PH« into B (the universe of the second sort)".
Let xp say "F2 is a bijection from Q%-into B". Obviously T u {<p}, Theorem 6.10. Let L* be a logic such that 2I¿*' < 2"*** whenever L is finite {for some fixed regular Na an¿ L* satisfies ROB(L*, L*) and FVP{L*, L*)).
Then L* is K-rc for each k > Ha with cí(k) > Ha.
Proof. Assume first k is regular and for contradiction L* is not K-rc. So by 6.6(ii) L* is not ic+-rc. For any S Q {ß\ß G k+ and cf(j3) = k} = CK put SBls = <k+, e, sy. Assume k > Xa+n. For Ka < k < t*a+n we argue with 6.6(ii) iteratedly. Since 2|A*1 < 2*«+" there are stationary sets SX,S2 G CK with (S, -Sj) u (52 -5,) = S3 stationary and WlSi = TtSz{L*). Put now 21 = <k+, E, 5,, 52, S3, cf> with cf(a) = cf(ot). Since L* is neither K-rc nor K+-rc we can expand 21 to a structure 930 and find a theory T in the expanded language M such that (i)930i=r, Case 1. There is a c.u.b set C Q A on which / is the identity. Then Sx n A = S2 n A but v40 is c.u.b in A, hence ^40 n S3 ¥= 0, a contradiction.
Case 2. There is a stationary set S Q A such that /: S -* A is regressive (otherwise take/-1). We shall prove an analogue of Fodor's theorem. So we obtain a sequence {ya+: a G k} < A0, which has a supremum 8 in A0. By property (iv) of T 8 is also a supremum in A. So we conclude that {£/). This proves Claim 4 and shows that/is not injective, which ends the proof of Claim 1. If k is singular and cî(k) > Ha, L* is cf(K)-rc and by Lemma 6.4(ii) L* is K-rc. □ Piecing this together we now prove Theorem 6.2: The set-theoretic conditions fit into the framework of 6.8 and 6.10. So L* is w-rc and since we can take a = 0 in 6.10 L* is K-rc for each k > w. With 6.6(i) we get the conclusion. □ Using 1.6 the condition on the size of L* can be replaced by a suitable Löwenheim-Skolem property. Also Theorems 6.8 and 6.10 can be rephrased with several logics; e.g.:
Theorem 6.10' (GCH). Assume IP c L* are two logics s.t. Corollary 6.13. L^, is characterized by
,e" provided 2*° < 2"-for some n G o>.
One might ask whether there are proper extensions of L^ satisfying ROB and FVp. Under the hypothesis of 6.10 such a logic is fully compact and hence satisfies Craig's theorem. In fact we conjecture Conjecture 6.14. Let L* = ¿""(ßO/e« De a l°Sic which satisfies ROB and FV,. Then L* = L^. have arbitrary large models. Let <p,(/) say that "/ is an injection of the first into the second sort" and <p2(g) say that "g is an injection of the second into the first sort". Clearly Tu {<p,} (i = 1,2) has a model. For let k' be such that <k'> ¥ F, and k' > p, so [k', /t] can be expanded to satisfy <p, and, by FV^,, [k', p] ¥ T and similarily for <p2. But then by ROB F u {<p" <p2) nas a model [k", p") so by the Cantor-Bernstein Theorem k" = /t". But by FV^,, k" G AT, p" G A" a contradiction. So w.l.o.g. AT contains only finite cardinals, hence, by compactness, the cardinals in K are bounded by some natural number n G « and A" G EQL^). Q
The argument above can still be extended (cf. [Ma5] ). Let K be a class of structures 21 of the form (A, E, Px, . .., P"> where A is the universe, F is an equivalence relation and P, are monadic predicates. If A" is closed under isomorphism and K G EC(L*) for L* = LM£Q%<m, the Q' arbitrary quantifiers, L* satisfies ROB and WP and Hu strong limit, then K G EQL^).
Here we use that two equivalence relations with k equivalence classes, each of cardinarlity k, are isomorphic.
This proves Conjecture 6.14 for some special classes of quantifiers. The problem remains of how to extend the above proof to arbitrary quantifiers.
Note that Caicedo [Ca] got a weak version of 6.15 without set-theoretic assumptions and FV^, but using (w, w)-compactness (cf. [Ma5] ).
7. The definability of the syntax-structure. In this section we present without proofs two abstract theorems due to Burgess and Paulos on the weak Beth-property. We follow [Fe2] for terminology.
Theorem 7.1 (Burgess) . Let L* be an absolute, normal logic, L* Q H{ux) such that WBETH(L*, L*) holds. Then the class of countable well-orderings is not PC(L*).
Theorem 7.2 (Paulos) . Let LP c LP be two logics such that L* is adequate to truth for LP and WBETHiL1*, LP) holds, then no syntax-structure of LP is Lû-definable.
Theorem 7.1 is a slight generalization of Paulos' theorem [Pa] . The main reason we quote these theorems here is that combining the methods of proofs together with 6.1 Gostanian and Hrbacek [GH] 8. Some direct applications. In this section we present some applications of the abstract theory. Less direct applications may be found in [MS2] , [MS3] . The table below shows how much can be drawn from the abstract approach.
Most of the notation of the table is self-evident. Ljf is the logic obtained from Lu u adding the game quantifier. LH is the logic obtained from L,â dding the Henkin quantifier. In fact any nonlinear partially ordered quantifier will lead to the same situation (cf. [Wa] no [MS2] no (comp) no [MS2] yesi* no L{aa)
UQ<") no [Bd] no (comp) no 5.4 yes [Bd] no 5.4 no 6.2 no 5.4
yes [MS2] no 7.2 no 6.2 no 7.2 no 7.2 no 8.1
Finally Lp is positive logic and L{aa) stationary logic (cf. [BKM] , [Ma4] and [MS2] ). L{Q<n) is the Magidor-Malitz logic from [MM] , L" is negative logic (cf. [BKM] , [MS2] ) and Ln is second order logic.
To make the table below more complete let us finish with a last observation.
Let Exy{<t>{x), ip{y)) be a binary quantifier binding two formulas and expressing that <b and 4> define sets of the same cardinality. Proposition 8.1. Let L* be a logic which is a set for each L and which extends L^E). Then WFV^L^F), L*) fails.
Examples for such L are LH or L11 (cf. [KL] ). Proof. Let A,B be two sets of different cardinality such that A = B{L*). Such sets exist by a Hanf type argument. But [A, B] ^ [A, ;4](L*) using the quantifier E. □ Added in proof (June 25, 1979) . If we redefine ROB by allowing arbitrary theories F,, F2 over arbitrary sets of predicates P instead of <p{P), ¡KP), the results of this section can be improved.
Theorem. Under the same set-theoretic hypothesis as in 6.10 if L* satisfies ROB, then L* is K-rc for each k > Na.
In the forthcoming paper by the same authors the amalgamation property of logics will be studied. We shall show that under much weaker assumptions than in 6.10 the amalgamation property implies full compactness. This will give us also some answers to Problem 2 in the introduction to this paper. The above version of ROB was suggested to us by a preprint of D. Mundici.
